China uses low-cost AI to expand its global influence

China is trying to turn artificial intelligence into a tool of international influence, according to The New York Times, which reports that the country is promoting open and low-cost AI software as part of a broader effort to win global goodwill. The strategy reflects a familiar idea in a new technological setting: countries do not only compete on military strength or trade leverage, but also on cultural appeal, technological access and the ability to set standards that others adopt. In China’s case, AI appears to be becoming part of that wider contest. What stands out in the Times report is the emphasis on openness and affordability. Those qualities matter because they can make Chinese AI tools easier for developers, companies and governments in other countries to try, especially in places where advanced AI systems from U.S. firms may be more expensive or less accessible. If a tool is widely available and simple to use, it can spread quickly and quietly build dependence, familiarity and trust. That does not automatically translate into political influence, and it is not clear from the available details how far this effort has already reached. But the broader logic is easy to see. In the same way that infrastructure, telecom equipment and consumer technology have long carried strategic weight, AI systems can influence what businesses build, what languages and data are prioritized, and which standards become normal. For Beijing, the appeal of an open model is also practical. By making software more accessible, China may be able to encourage adoption abroad while also presenting itself as a partner in technological development rather than simply a rival. That framing could be especially useful in regions looking for cheaper digital tools and alternatives to more tightly controlled platforms. The report also points to a larger shift in how soft power is being defined. Traditionally, soft power has been linked to music, film, universities, tourism and other forms of cultural attraction. In the A.I. era, however, software itself can become an instrument of statecraft. A model used by developers around the world may do more to shape perceptions than a campaign of slogans ever could. Still, important questions remain. Open software can be attractive for speed and cost, but users will also care about performance, reliability, safety and privacy. The article as described does not spell out how Chinese AI tools compare with major rivals on those measures, or how foreign governments may respond if they see the tools as carrying strategic risk. There is also the question of whether openness is a long-term principle or a tactical advantage. A country can promote generous access while conditions are favorable, then tighten control later. That tension is especially relevant in AI, where the code may be open, but the data, infrastructure and policy environment are still shaped by the state. For readers, the key takeaway is that the global AI race is not only about who builds the most powerful systems. It is also about who makes those systems easiest to adopt, and who can turn that adoption into influence. China appears to be betting that in the A.I. age, soft power may come not just from culture or diplomacy, but from the software people use every day.

Source: New York Times Business - https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/23/business/china-ai-soft-power.html